Keep the controls that run the system away from the things ordinary users touch.
What it actually means
Administrative and management functions — admin consoles, management interfaces, server back-ends — should be separated from the user-facing side of a system. In practice that means admins use separate admin accounts and dedicated management interfaces, and ordinary users can't reach management functions. This limits the blast radius if a user account is compromised.
Pass or fail — an assessor needs a "yes" to each
- Are administrative interfaces separated from ordinary user functionality (separate accounts, separate access paths)?
- Are management consoles restricted so standard users can't reach them?
What to have ready
- Account / role configuration showing separate admin accounts
- Network or access-control configuration restricting management interfaces
Where teams trip up
- Admins using their everyday user account to manage systems
- Management interfaces reachable from the general user network
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More in System & Communications Protection (3.13)
3.13.1 — Protect your boundaries3.13.2 — Build security in by design3.13.4 — Stop data leaking through shared resources3.13.5 — Wall off your public-facing systems3.13.6 — Deny all, permit by exception3.13.7 — Block split tunneling on VPNs3.13.8 — Encrypt CUI in transit3.13.9 — Drop idle network sessions3.13.10 — Manage your encryption keys3.13.11 — FIPS-validated cryptography3.13.12 — Control cameras and microphones3.13.13 — Control mobile code3.13.14 — Control and monitor VoIP3.13.15 — Protect session authenticity3.13.16 — Encrypt CUI at rest